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LOOPHOLES FOR THE 
AFFLUENT BANKRUPT 
DAVID R. HAGUE†  
[The] rich get richer [until] the poor get educated.1 
— Sage Francis 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent bankruptcy cases are exposing a problem.  Affluent 
individuals filing for bankruptcy are treated more favorably under 
the Bankruptcy Code than those debtors with little to no means of 
financial sustenance or income.  Did Congress intend this result?  
The legislative history is unclear.  But one thing seems certain: 
The United States Bankruptcy Code contains a set of loopholes 
that appear to be designed for the well-to-do segment of society.  
Courts throughout the United States are either overlooking these 
provisions or simply condoning their utilization under the de-
fensible conviction that the Bankruptcy Code permits it.   
In this Article, I argue that the Bankruptcy Code unfairly 
discriminates against individuals of lower-class economic status.  
Specifically, I identify two loopholes—one found in Chapter 7 and 
one located in Chapter 11—that are arguably intended to benefit 
those with high incomes and significant assets.  Courts need to 
consider whether the use of these loopholes is permitted under the 
Code, and if so, how they should be addressed in individual bank-
ruptcy cases.  The Bankruptcy Code should create a level playing 
field for debtors—not an oasis for the affluent. 
Two scenarios demonstrate that the United States Bankruptcy 
Code favors those with higher incomes living lavish lifestyles.  
Imagine Bob, a successful businessman, owes you $50,000 on 
an unsecured personal loan.  Bob has a substantial amount of as-
sets, but the majority of those assets are exempt.  Bob makes a 
good living, bringing in over $200,000 a year.  Bob also has a fair 
 
† Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. 
1 SAGE FRANCIS, Slow Down Gandhi, on A HEALTHY DISTRUST (Epitaph Records 
2005). 
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amount of disposable income after his monthly expenses are taken 
care of.  But most of this excess income has been used by Bob to 
put a pool and a tennis court on the grounds of his extravagant 
home.  A substantial amount of Bob’s debt derives from a personal 
guaranty he signed years ago so that his friend could open up a 
small coffee shop.  In addition, he also has some student loan debt, 
which he accumulated while pursuing his MBA.   
Bob has some other unsecured debt, too, but he is refusing to 
pay.  Creditors are stacking up.  Bob decides to file for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, where a trustee will be appointed to sell all of Bob’s 
nonexempt assets and then distribute the proceeds to Bob’s credi-
tors, after which Bob will receive a discharge of his debt—or what 
lawyers refer to as “straight liquidation.”2 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy is very appealing to Bob.  All of Bob’s as-
sets are exempt, so he can basically receive a discharge for free.  
“Wait!” a friend tells you.  “Bob makes too much money to qualify 
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.3  He should be relegated to Chapter 13, 
where he will be required to pay you, and his other creditors, his 
hefty disposable income for the next three to five years.”4  In fact, 
your friend tells you she knows of a few people who tried to file for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, but failed to qualify because their incomes 
were too high.   
In Bob’s case, he will likely be able to stiff his creditors in 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy without having any of his valuable assets 
touched by the trustee.  In most cases, in order to qualify for Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy, a debtor must pass what is commonly referred 
to as a qualifying “Means Test.”  The Means Test is a formula 
designed to keep bankruptcy filers with higher incomes from filing 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code.5  Interestingly, only filers with “primarily consumer debts” 
need to satisfy this test.6  Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides “the court . . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual 
debtor under [Chapter 7] whose debts are primarily consumer 
debts . . . if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of 
the provisions of [Chapter 7].”7  Thus, it is a prerequisite that the 
 
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2018); 1 ALLISON SJOBERG ET AL., ASSET PROTECTION: 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS § 3:8 (2019). 
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
4 See id. § 1325(a)(4). 
5 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i); ALLISON SJOBERG ET AL., supra note 2. 
6 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). 
7 Id.  
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debts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case be “primarily consumer 
debts” before dismissal can occur pursuant to section 707(b).8   
Under section 101(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, a “consumer 
debt” is defined as a “debt incurred by an individual primarily for 
a personal, family, or household purpose.”9  In determining wheth-
er debt is for a “personal, family, or household purpose,”10 courts 
generally look to the purpose for which the debt was incurred.  
Debt incurred for a business venture or with a profit motive does 
not fall into the category of debt incurred for “personal, family, or 
household purpose[s].”  Most courts conclude that the ratio of the 
dollar amount of consumer debt to non-consumer debt should 
control in determining whether the indebtedness is primarily 
consumer debt for purposes of 707(b).11  
Consequently, if over 50 percent of Bob’s total debt arises out 
of a personal guaranty agreement, for example, which was exe-
cuted for a business venture or profit motive, section 707(b) would 
not apply, and he could file for Chapter 7 protection.12  In other 
words, because Bob qualifies as a “businessman,” he can take ad-
vantage of Chapter 7 liquidation and receive a full discharge of his 
debts within a few months after filing for bankruptcy.13   
By contrast, imagine your friend Gabe is injured in a horrific 
motorcycle accident.  He makes approximately $70,000 a year as a 
plumber.  As a result of the accident and a financially draining 
divorce, he is left with hundreds of thousands of dollars of debt.  
Gabe’s situation seems a lot worse than Bob’s, but nonetheless, 
Gabe likely will not be able to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 
7.  Oddly, despite Gabe’s income being $130,000 less than Bob’s, 
his income is still too high to pass Chapter 7’s qualifying means 
test—a factor that now matters since the majority of Gabe’s debt 
is “consumer debt[ ].”14 
Imagine another scenario.  You represent a bank.  The bank has 
lent $1.5 million to a wealthy individual, who has been living a 
lavish lifestyle.  The majority of her income has come from a wealthy 
father and a trust fund.  The individual does not have sufficient 
“business” debt, so the Means Test of Chapter 7 would prevent her 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. § 101(8). 
10 Id. 
11 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).  
13 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
14 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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from filing under Chapter 7.15  She also does not want to be rele-
gated to Chapter 13, where a trustee would basically babysit her 
for the next three to five years and require that she turn over her 
monthly disposable income.16  Instead, the spoiled child is told she 
can liquidate her nonexempt assets in order to fund a Chapter 11 
plan, rather than pay future disposable income to creditors under 
Chapter 13.  Under Chapter 11, the individual would basically give 
her assets to a liquidating trust, which would then complete 
distribution of funds to creditors, after which the individual would 
receive a discharge of debt and then go back to living her lavish 
lifestyle.  
Do these scenarios seem fair?  It seems peculiar, and unfair, 
that both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code have 
provisions in which individuals with significant incomes, or assets, 
or who are labeled as a “businessman,” are treated more favorably 
than the typical struggling debtor.   
In this Article, I first analyze whether Chapter 7 allows indi-
viduals with primarily business debts to avoid the so-called 
“Means” Test altogether and successfully receive a discharge.  In 
doing so, I discuss ways in which individuals with higher incomes 
have manipulated this provision to avoid paying their financial 
obligations.  I also discuss whether good faith plays a role in the 
Means Test analysis.   
After discussing the Means Test manipulation under Chapter 
7, I analyze a second issue under the Bankruptcy Code which 
benefits the affluent: Whether individuals with a high net worth, 
but no current cash flow, can liquidate their nonexempt assets to 
fund a Chapter 11 plan, rather than contribute future disposable 
income per Chapter 13.17  In conjunction, this Article then deter-
mines whether “completion of payments” occurs once the debtor 
gives all of her assets to a liquidating trust, who then completes 
distribution to the creditors.   
Under Chapter 13, a debtor’s plan must extend for three 
years, and in some cases five years, unless the plan provides for 
payment in full of all unsecured claims sooner.18  Chapter 11 is 
different.  Section 1129(a)(15), which applies only to Chapter 11 
plans, does not specify a minimum period or a commitment period.19  
 
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). 
16 See id. § 1325(b)(1)(B), (b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
17 See id. § 1322(a)(4). 
18 See id. § 1325(b)(4). 
19 See id. § 1129(a)(15). 
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Rather, section 1129(a)(15) requires either that the debtor pay all 
unsecured claims in full or that the debtor’s plan devote an amount 
equal to five years’ worth of the debtor’s “projected disposable 
income.”20  In other words, the requirement in section 1129(a)(15) 
is that “the value of the property” distributed be equal to the 
“disposable income.”21 
In a case where a debtor has assets that can be liquidated to 
fund a plan, if the value of those assets equals the projected 
disposable income, then section 1129(a)(15) would arguably be 
satisfied even if no disposable income is contributed.22  Further-
more, under section 1141(d), the general rule in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases involving individuals is that the discharge will 
not be entered until the debtor has completed all payments under 
the plan.23 
Does this reading of the Bankruptcy Code mean that a debtor 
could simply set up a liquidating trust, deliver all of her assets to 
that trust, and then experience a discharge because there has been 
a “completion of payments”?  And as long as those delivered assets 
equals the five-year “projected disposable income,” then is section 
1129(a)(15) satisfied even if no disposable income is contributed?  
Is this fair to creditors and is this what Congress intended? 
I argue that such a literal interpretation allows a debtor to 
distort her “projected disposable income,” receive a discharge, and 
abuse the bankruptcy process by living a lavish lifestyle, all while 
paying creditors a fraction of their claims.  To bolster this argu-
ment, I also examine section 1129(a)(3)’s good faith requirement. 
I.  BANKRUPTCY BASICS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
A. Chapter 7 
To fully understand the abuse that occurs under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, one must grasp the concepts of Chapters 7, 11, and 
13.  Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled “liquidation” and 
is sometimes referred to as “straight bankruptcy.”24  Chapter 7 is 
the most common chapter used by debtors because its purpose is 
 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. § 1141(d). 
24 David Haynes, What is Chapter 7 Bankruptcy?, THE BALANCE (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-bankruptcy-316202 [https://perma.cc/PZC2-TUGW]. 
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to provide debtors with a “fresh start.”25  In a Chapter 7 bankrupt-
cy case, a trustee is appointed and her duty is to collect the 
nonexempt property of the debtor, convert that property to cash, 
and distribute that cash to creditors in accordance with the 
distribution scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.26  Essentially, the 
debtor gives up all nonexempt property owned at the time of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition in exchange for a discharge of all 
incurred debt.27 
In a very simplified overview, a Chapter 7 case contains the 
following basic stages: (1) a Chapter 7 petition is filed; (2) the filing 
of the petition results in the stay of creditor collection activity28 
and the appointment of a trustee to administer the case;29 (3) the 
debtor exercises exemption rights with respect to owned property;30 
(4) the trustee collects and sells or liquidates any property avail-
able for distribution to the creditors;31 (5) the proceeds from the 
sale of the property are used to pay administrative expenses and 
the claims of the creditors according to the Bankruptcy Code’s pri-
ority scheme;32 and (6) the debtor may be discharged from any re-
maining prepetition debts33 that are not exempted from discharge.34 
B. Chapter 13  
Two basic goals of bankruptcy are oft-stated: The first and 
“principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh 
start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’ ”35  However, the fresh 
start must be balanced with the subsequent goal of ensuring “the 
 
25 Id. 
26 11 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
27 The right to a discharge is not absolute, and some types of debt are not 
discharged. For example, if the debtor has committed some bad act enumerated in 
section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may not be entitled to any discharge. 
Id. § 727(a). Moreover, certain enumerated debts set forth in section 523(a) are not 
dischargeable. Id. § 523(a). Additionally, bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish 
consensual liens on the debtor’s property. Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re 
Young), No. 04-32102, 2007 WL 1159952, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2007). 
28 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
29 Id. § 701(a). 
30 See id. § 522(b). 
31 See id. § 704(a). 
32 See id. § 726(a). 
33 See id. § 727(b). 
34 See id. § 523(a). 
35 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (quoting Grogan 
v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991)). 
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fair and equitable treatment of the creditors of a debtor in bank-
ruptcy.”36  As the United States Supreme Court stated, “a central 
purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain 
insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their 
creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life with a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
preexisting debt.’ ”37 
Although the goals of Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code are the same, the Chapter 13 process differs significantly 
from the Chapter 7 process.  “Chapter 13 authorizes an individual 
with regular income to obtain a discharge after the successful 
completion of a payment plan approved by the bankruptcy court.”38  
Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, in a Chapter 13 case, “the 
debtor retains assets, often his home, . . . subject to [the] court-
approved plan.”39  The repayment plan in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
case has a duration of three to five years—the applicable 
“commitment period”—depending on whether the Chapter 13 
debtor has monthly income below or above the national median.40  
Further, plan payments are made from a debtor’s calculated 
“future earnings or other future income.”41  Notably:  
That three to five year commitment period, while onerous in the 
sense that the debtor is continuously under the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court, provides some relief for the debtor regarding 
his nondischargeable unsecured debt.  For example, collection of 
unsecured taxes and student loans are stayed during the pen-
dency of the Chapter 13 case due to the bankruptcy automatic 
stay, whereas those creditors could commence collection against 
the Chapter 7 debtor immediately after discharge is entered in 
the comparatively much shorter Chapter 7 case.42   
In addition, debtors are not allowed to incur debt without authoriza-
tion, which means they “must learn to live within a budget during 
the time they are under the [bankruptcy] Court’s jurisdiction.”43 
 
36 In re Westby, 473 B.R. 392, 401 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012). 
37 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
38 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. 
39 Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1834 (2015).  
40 See Hamilton v. Lanning (In re Lanning), 545 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the applicable commitment period for below-median and above-median 
debtors), aff’d, 560 U.S. 505 (2010). 
41 Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1835 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (2018)). 
42 In re Wark, 542 B.R. 522, 530 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015).  
43 Id.  
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Although the Chapter 7 process is much faster, it is also a 
much more demanding process.  As set forth above, in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding, “the debtor’s assets are immediately 
liquidated and the proceeds [are] distributed to creditors.”44  In 
Harris, the Supreme Court explained that “Chapter 7 allows a 
debtor to make a clean break from his financial past, but at a steep 
price: prompt liquidation of the debtor’s assets.”45 
There are also significant differences in who is eligible to file 
a petition under each Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.  While the 
Chapter 13 process is “wholly voluntary,”46 Chapter 13 relief is 
only available to “an individual with regular income” who owes 
debts that are less than a specified sum set forth in the Code.47  
Further, and as discussed in detail below, in order to file a Chapter 
7 petition, the debtor must pass a Means Test, which basically 
provides that if a debtor’s “current monthly income” is less than or 
equal to the median income for her governing state, then she is 
presumed to be eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.48 
Lastly, and relevant to this Article, postpetition wages are 
treated differently by Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.  For example, 
with “a Chapter 13 proceeding, postpetition wages are ‘[p]roperty 
of the estate’ and may be collected by the Chapter 13 trustee for 
distribution to creditors.  In a Chapter 7 proceeding, those earn-
ings are not estate property; instead, they belong to the debtor.”49  
Consequently, because of this differing treatment, the Supreme 
Court has stated:  
Proceedings under Chapter 13 can benefit debtors and creditors 
alike.  Debtors are allowed to retain their assets, commonly their 
home or car.  And creditors, entitled to a Chapter 13 debtor’s 
“disposable” postpetition income, usually collect more under a 
Chapter 13 plan than they would have received under a Chapter 
7 liquidation.50 
C. Chapter 11 
Every debtor that commences a voluntary case under Chapter 
11—including an individual—is presumed to intend to bring about 
 
44 Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1834.  
45 Id. at 1835.  
46 Id.  
47 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2018).  
48 See Hamilton v. Lanning (In re Lanning), 545 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2008) (discussing the Means Test), aff’d, 560 U.S. 505 (2010). 
49 Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1834 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  
50 Id. at 1835 (citation omitted).  
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consensual acceptance and court approval of what is called a “plan 
of reorganization.”  The word “plan” appears in several places in 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 1103(c)(3), for example, states that 
one of the important duties of a creditor’s committee is to 
“participate in the formulation of a plan.”51  Moreover, section 
1106(a)(5) mandates the debtor in possession file “a plan” “as soon 
as practicable” after the commencement of a case.52  And sections 
1112(b)(4)(J)–(M) authorize dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 
11 case for failure to propose, confirm, or carry out the provisions 
of “a plan.”53  The confirmation of a plan is the prime objective of a 
Chapter 11 case.54  Nonetheless, the idea of “a plan” and “confir-
mation” of a plan can be a nebulous concept for those unfamiliar 
with bankruptcy law.   
At its core, “[a] plan of reorganization is a contract which 
binds a debtor and its creditors.”55  A plan tells the creditors what 
they will receive on account of their claims and when and how they 
will receive it.  As the Second Circuit observed, “[t]he plan of reor-
ganization determines how much and in what form creditors will 
be paid, whether stockholders will continue to retain any interests, 
and in what form the business will continue.”56  Generally, a plan 
must be accepted by creditors and confirmed by the court in order 
to become effective.  “Once a plan is confirmed, the preconfirma-
tion debt is ‘replaced’ with a new indebtedness as provided in the 
confirmed plan.  The new indebtedness is in essence a new and 
binding contract between the debtor and the creditors.”57 
Some individual debtors may not be able to obtain meaningful 
relief under Chapters 7 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.58  Indeed, 
Chapter 7 may not afford meaningful relief to some individuals 
because it does not allow them to retain nonexempt assets, which 
may be necessary for a fresh start.  And while Chapter 13 provides 
for a restructuring of a debtor’s debt and the retention of property, 
 
51 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3).  
52 Id. § 1106(a)(5).  
53 Id. § 1112(b)(4)(J)–(M). 
54 See id. § 1112(b)(4)(J). 
55 In re Pettibone Corp., 134 B.R. 349, 351–52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).  
56 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983). 
57 Fed. Land Bank of Jackson v. Herron (In re Herron), 60 B.R. 82, 84 (Bankr. 
W.D. La. 1986); see also In re Ernst, 45 B.R. 700, 702 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (“The 
plan is essentially a new and binding contract, sanctioned by the Court, between a 
debtor and his preconfirmation creditors.”).  
58 See Andrew G. Balbus, Does the Absolute Priority Rule Apply to Individuals in 
Chapter 11?, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 79, 82 (2011). 
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certain debtors do not qualify for Chapter 13 bankruptcy because 
of the debt limits it imposes.59  As a result, individual debtors with 
higher net worth seek relief in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.60  
When individuals file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a few 
unique provisions of the Bankruptcy Code come into play.  One of 
those provisions is section 1123(a)(8), which ensures that a debtor 
devotes income to plan implementation and creditor claims.61  This 
provision requires the individual Chapter 11 debtor’s plan to 
provide “all or such portion of earnings from personal ser-
vices . . . or other future income . . . as is necessary for the execu-
tion of the plan.”62  Another provision, section 1129(a)(15), requires 
individual Chapter 11 debtors to either pay all allowed unsecured 
claims in full—which is highly unlikely—or devote an amount 
equal to five years’ worth of the debtor’s “projected disposable 
income” to property to be distributed under the plan.63  Finally, 
section 1141(d)(5) provides a discharge date for individuals in a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process, which occurs “on completion of all 
payments under the plan.”64 
II.  DID CONGRESS REALLY “MEAN” THIS? 
A. What is the Means Test? 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005—referred to by most practitioners and judges as 
“BAPCPA”—became effective on October 17, 2005.65  When en-
acted, the goal of BAPCPA was “to address what Congress 
perceived to be certain abuses of the bankruptcy process.  Among 
the abuses identified by Congress was the easy access to [C]hapter 
7 liquidation proceedings by consumer debtors who, if required to 
 
59 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). 
60 See Balbus, supra note 58 (“[M]any individuals have no alternative to filing in 
Chapter 11. Individuals with household incomes over the median income for similar 
sized households in their state may not qualify for Chapter 7 under § 707(b). 
Individuals with large amounts of debt or without regular income may not qualify for 
Chapter 13 under § 109(e).”). 
61 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(8). 
62 Id.  
63 See id. § 1129(a)(15).  
64 Id. § 1141(d)(5). 
65 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, § 1501, 119 Stat. 23, 216 (2005) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 note (Effective 
Date of 2005 Amendment)). 
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file under [C]hapter 13, could afford to pay some dividend to their 
unsecured creditors.”66 
To steer more debtors capable of paying their unsecured credi-
tors away from Chapter 7 and into a repayment plan under 
Chapter 13, Congress retooled section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  
Section 707(b)(1) provides that the court, after notice and a 
hearing, may dismiss a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case “or, with the 
debtor’s consent, convert such a case to [one] under [C]hapter 11 
or 13, of this title, if [the court] finds that the granting of relief 
[under Chapter 7] would be an abuse of the provisions” enu-
merated within the chapter.67  BAPCPA, however, changed the 
circumstances under which a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case may be 
dismissed by removing the “substantial” qualifier and providing 
for “abuse,” to be determined pursuant to the provisions of section 
707(b).68  When a debtor’s disposable income exceeds fixed 
amounts—that is, when the debtor fails the Means Test—section 
707(b)(2) creates a presumption of abuse.69  If the presumption of 
abuse does not arise—that is, when the debtor passes the Means 
Test—section 707(b)(3) looks to “whether the debtor filed the 
petition in bad faith” or whether the “totality of the circum-
stances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates 
abuse.”70 
The Means Test provides a formula which calculates a 
debtor’s average monthly disposable income over a sixty-month 
period.  By deducting statutorily specified expenses, secured debt 
payments, and priority debt payments from “current monthly 
income,” the Means Test is able to calculate the debtor’s approxi-
mate disposable income.  The Bankruptcy Code defines the “current 
monthly income” of a debtor to include “all sources” in the six-
month period prior to commencement of the bankruptcy case.71  
Sections 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) specify the authorized deductions 
from current monthly income.72  If the resulting income figure 
exceeds certain mathematical threshold amounts, the Chapter 7 
 
66 In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing 151 CONG. 
REC. S2,469–70 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statements of Sens. Grassley & Nelson)).  
67 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). 
68 In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 720–21. 
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(i). 
70 Id. § 707(b)(3). 
71 Id. § 101(10A).  
72 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv). 
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bankruptcy filing is presumptively abusive.73  Specifically, the 
Bankruptcy Code provides that the court “shall presume” that the 
debtor’s case is an abuse of Chapter 7 “if the debtor’s current 
monthly income,” less the amounts deductible under sections 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv), “and multiplied by 60[,] is not less than the 
lesser of” (A) “25 percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured 
claims in the case, or $6,000, whichever is greater; or” (B) “$10,000.”74 
The presumption of abuse that arises from having a high 
income may only be rebutted by establishing special circum-
stances, “such as a serious medical condition” or proof of an “order 
to [be on] active duty in the Armed Forces.”75  Further, the Means 
Test does not apply to disabled veterans if the debt was accrued 
primarily while they were on active duty76 or “performing a 
homeland defense activity.”77 
In short, the Means Test is nothing more than a “screening 
mechanism” set forth in the Bankruptcy Code to determine 
whether a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing is appropriate or would 
result in debtor abuse.78  If a debtor’s disposable income is above 
the amounts listed within the Code, then the debtor is capable of 
reimbursing creditors and will not be able to liquidate all 
nonexempt assets under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.  The goal of 
the statute is clear: to keep debtors from abusing the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.79 
B. What Did Congress “Mean”? 
In 1978, Congress drafted the United States Bankruptcy 
Code.  This was Congress’s first attempt to structure and unify 
bankruptcy procedures in the United States since 1898.80  The 1978 
code provided, in section 707, limited language with respect to the 
dismissal of consumer bankruptcy filings.  The provision in its 
 
73 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).  
74 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
75 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). 
76 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1) (2018) (defining active duty as “full-time training duty, 
annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school 
designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military department 
concerned”). 
77 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D)(i). 
78 In re Rivers, 466 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Ransom v. FIA 
Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 65 n.1 (2011)). 
79 Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the 
rule adopted by a majority of the courts is “that a debtor’s ability to pay his debts will, 
standing alone, justify a section 707(b) dismissal”). 
80 See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541 (1898).  
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entirety states:  “The court may dismiss a case under this chapter 
only after notice and a hearing and only for cause including—
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to credi-
tors; and (2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under 
chapter 123 of title 28.”81  
The provision granted bankruptcy judges the sole discretion 
to dismiss a case after a debtor or creditor made the petition for 
dismissal.82  The vague language of section 707 also granted judges 
the sole power to interpret the “for cause” requirement of the 
section.83  This led to variances in the administration and appli-
cation of consumer bankruptcy dismissals as well as a staggering 
increase in the number of individuals filing for bankruptcy under 
section 707.  In the four years after the enactment of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code, the number of annual individual “bankruptcy 
filings more than doubled . . . from 172,423 to 449,839.”84 
In 1984, in response to the increase in bankruptcy filings, 
Congress passed several amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
that were aimed at stymieing the number of consumer filings that 
could be handled by partial repayment under Chapter 13.  Some 
of the provisions adopted by the 1984 amendments included dis-
missing a filing for “failure . . . to abide by orders of the court” or, 
if “the debtor requested and obtained [a] voluntary dismissal of the 
case[,] following the filing of a request for relief from [an] 
automatic stay.”85  Additionally, the 1984 amendments permitted 
a bankruptcy court to “dismiss a case filed by an individual 
debtor . . . whose debts [were] primarily consumer debts.”86  If the 
court found that the granting of bankruptcy relief would be a 
“substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy provisions based on the type 
of debt incurred by the debtor, the court had complete discretion 
to dismiss the case.87  By and large, however, the amendments 
were weak and did little to slow the increasing number of 
consumer filings they were intended to stifle.88 
 
81 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 707, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707). 
82 See In re Blackmon, 3 B.R. 167, 169 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); see also In re Lang, 
5 B.R. 371, 375 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
83 See Blackmon, 3 B.R. at 169. 
84 Wayne R. Wells et al., The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): 
The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 15, 17 (1991). 
85 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-353, § 301, 98 Stat. 333, 352 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)). 
86 Id. § 312, 98 Stat. at 355 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)).  
87 Id  
88 See Wells et al., supra note 84, at 17–18.  
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Attempts to amend and better define when a consumer bank-
ruptcy filing could and should be dismissed were made in the two 
decades following the enactment of the 1984 amendments, but 
they all ultimately failed.89  In 2005, Congress successfully passed 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (BAPCPA) and created the Means Test, which requires 
individuals filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to rebut the presumption that a filing is abusive by 
demonstrating a financial need created by an inability to pay off 
their debt.90   
The Means Test is “[t]he heart” of BAPCPA given Congress’s 
desire to prevent apparent abuse of the bankruptcy system.91  With 
the Means Test, the legislature intended to maximize the amount 
debtors are repaying, or will repay, to their creditors.92  There has 
been much debate over the true intent of Congress in the 
enactment of BAPCPA.93  However, the Supreme Court has stated: 
The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the 
existing statutory text and not the predecessor statutes.  It is well 
established that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by 
the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”94 
A plain reading of the statute provides that Congress intended 
to ensure that those who do not qualify for straight liquidation 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code will have their plans 
converted to Chapter 11 or 13 because those who have the 
resources to pay creditors should do so.95  As stated above, the 
Means Test determines whether a debtor has the capability of 
affording reasonable and necessary expenses while leaving enough 
 
89 See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown on 
Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 248 (2015). 
90 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231–32, 
244, 250 (2010) (finding that disclosure requirements in the Code “are reasonably 
related to the [government’s] interest in preventing deception of consumers” (quoting 
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).  
91 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 64 (2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005)). 
92 See id.  
93 See In re Woodman, 287 B.R. 589, 592 (Bankr. D. Me. 2003) (discussing whether 
Congress intended to differentiate between pre-existing definitions and existing 
definitions in the Act), aff’d sub nom. Evergreen Credit Union v. Woodman (In re 
Woodman), 379 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004).  
94 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. 
Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (reiterating the proper stan-
dard in which to analyze Congressional intent).  
95 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005). 
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disposable income to pay back creditors.96  A debtor can only claim 
“applicable” expenses when calculating his or her disposable 
income.97  Hence, if Congress did not want to distinguish between 
those who qualify for the allowance and those who do not, it would 
“have omitted the term ‘applicable’ altogether.”98  If the word “ap-
plicable” were omitted from the statute, any debtor could qualify 
for any monthly expense in an effort to achieve a desired result.  
The Code defines a debtor’s disposable income as her “current 
monthly income . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be ex-
pended.”99  Because these amounts will be deducted from the cur-
rent monthly income, a debtor should be required to qualify for the 
allowance by incurring an expense in the authorized category.  
BAPCPA’s objectives are then achieved by requiring a debtor to 
qualify for the kind of expense for which she claims a deduction for 
the Means Test. 
Pre-BAPCPA, the method for determining a debtors’ reason-
able expenses led to inconsistent determinations.100  The previous 
“test required judges to make significant value judgments” that led 
to diverse rulings, particularly regarding whether certain expenses 
“were justifiable.”101  Some courts read this to mean only expenses 
that are a basic need are justifiable.102  This interpretation of the 
text led different courts to disagree about the actual definition of 
basic needs.103  Courts found the determination as to whether most 
needs were basic to be within their discretion.104  The standard 
used to reach these inconsistent results considered an expenditure 
 
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2018). 
97 See Ransom, 562 U.S. at 69–70. 
98 Id.  
99 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
100 In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 294 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007) (“Before BAPCPA, 
courts and the relevant statute defined ‘projected disposable income’ as income not 
reasonably necessary for maintaining or supporting the debtor or a dependent, with 
that determination being made on an estimated basis at plan confirmation.” (citation 
omitted)).  
101 Id. See also In re Woodman, 287 B.R. 589, 592–93 (Bankr. D. Me. 2003) (finding 
that a tobacco expense of $240 each month was reasonable and necessary), aff’d sub 
nom. Evergreen Credit Union v. Woodman (In re Woodman), 379 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2004); Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (finding 
that $395 each month for private school tuition was not reasonably necessary).  
102 See In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 466–67 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (holding that 
private education is not a basic need because the debtor’s daughter could alternatively 
attend a local public school).  
103 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (outlining the basic needs and what they entail under 
the Code as opposed to how the courts interpret them). 
104 See, e.g., In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604, 607–08 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
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to be “reasonably necessary” if most reasonable persons could 
agree as to whether the expenditure is reasonably necessary.105  
However, the “reasonable person” standard cannot be reliably 
applied to individual monthly incomes because there is little to no 
evidence on which a judge can rely upon to determine whether 
“most people” would consider a monthly expenditure as reasonably 
necessary.106  
According to the House Judiciary Committee Report on the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, “[t]he purpose of the bill [was] to improve bankruptcy law 
and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in 
the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both 
debtors and creditors.”107  The bill garnered bipartisan support, as 
well as “support from the business community, banking and 
financial services industries [and] other groups such as family 
farmers and child support enforcement agencies.”108 
Congressman Todd Tiahrt, when speaking in support of the 
passage of the bill before the United States House of Represen-
tatives, stated: “The bill we are voting on today will help foster 
greater personal responsibility and make it more difficult for those 
who use bankruptcy as a tool for fraud to cheat their way out of 
debt.”109  Congressman Tiahrt further explained that the country 
cannot continue to routinely direct “high consumer debt” to 
bankruptcy as a first resort.110  Although Tiahrt was “pleased [the 
bill] addresse[d] common bankruptcy abuses while continuing to 
offer Americans who need to file for bankruptcy the means to do 
so,” he recognized this should be “a last resort.”111  In an opinion 
issued by the United States Attorney’s Office about BAPCPA, 
bankruptcy abuse is defined as the “discharging [of] debts which 
debtors theoretically could afford, at least in part, to pay.”112  This 
illustrates the growing concern of individual debt liquidation and 
the need for a mechanism that requires individuals to enroll in a 
repayment plan.  
 
105 Id. at 607.  
106 Id. 
107 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005). 
108 See id. at 6. 
109 109 CONG. REC. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2005) (statement of Rep. Todd Tiahrt). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Judith Benderson, Introduction: A History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. (Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys, 
Washington, D.C.) July 2006, at 1, 1. 
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The House Judiciary Committee enumerated the four factors 
that prompted Congress to draft and ultimately pass BAPCPA:  
1. “[T]he recent escalation of consumer bankruptcy filings does 
not appear to be just a temporary event, but part of a generally 
consistent upward trend.”113 
As support, the Committee cited the increase in the total 
number of annual bankruptcy filings: “Over the past decade, the 
number of bankruptcy filings has nearly doubled to more than 1.6 
million cases filed in fiscal year 2004.  As a result, there is a 
growing perception that bankruptcy relief may be too readily 
available . . . .”114  
2. “[T]here are significant losses asserted to be associated with 
bankruptcy filings.”115 
[I]n 1997 alone, more than $44 billion of debt was discharged by 
debtors who filed for bankruptcy relief, a figure when amortized 
on a yearly basis amounts to a loss of at least $110 million every 
day.  These losses, according to one estimate, translate into a 
$400 annual “tax” on every household in our nation.116 
 
3. “[T]he present bankruptcy system has loopholes and in-
centives that allow and—sometimes—even encourage opportunistic 
personal filings and abuse.”117 
According to the United States Trustee Program, a component 
of the Justice Department charged with administrative oversight 
of bankruptcy cases, “ ‘[a]buse of the system is more widespread 
than many would have estimated.’  Such abuse ultimately hurts 
consumers as well as creditors.”118  
4. “[S]ome bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a significant 
portion of their debts, according to several studies.”119 
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, there was “no clear mandate 
requiring debtors to repay their debts.”120  Instead, many individ-
uals chose to file under Chapter 7 even if they had the means to 
 
113 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3 (2005).  
114 Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
117 Id. at 5. 
118 Id. (quoting J. Christopher Marshall, Civil Enforcement: An Early Report, J. 
NAT’L ASS’N BANKR. TRS. (NABTALK), Fall 2002, at 39). 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
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set up a repayment plan under Chapter 13.121  The 1984 amend-
ments set up the Means Test for dismissing a filing under Chapter 
7 for “substantial abuse,” but the courts differed in their deter-
mination of what qualified as “substantial abuse.”122  
Since the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the number 
of individuals filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 has steadily 
increased.123  Congress identified many of these filings as abusive 
because the filers had the capacity to repay at least some of their 
debts, making a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing more appropriate.124  
In short, the Means Test acts as a filtering process to ensure that 
those who are capable of paying their debts, in fact do so.  
Congress’s enactment of BAPCPA and the Means Test was a 
response to the systematic abuse of bankruptcy.  This is clear from 
the language in the statute and the previous measures in the Code 
that led to a wide range of results.  By creating particular 
categories of expenditures that qualify as allowances, Congress 
narrowed the definition of “reasonably necessary,” as well as who 
can qualify for such allowances.  
C. The Non-Consumer Debt Exception  
As set forth above, only Chapter 7 cases “filed by an individual 
debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts” may be subject 
to dismissal for abuse.125  Accordingly, a threshold issue in many 
Chapter 7 cases is whether the debtor’s debts are primarily 
consumer debts.  If they are not, section 707(b) does not apply, 
ending the inquiry.  If more than half of a debtor’s total debt is 
consumer debt, the “primarily consumer debts” standard found in 
seciton 707(b)(1) is implicated and the Means Test or a totality 
analysis126 may proceed.  
Section 101(8) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “consumer 
debt” as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, 
family, or household purpose.”127  
 
121 Id. at 5 & n.18.  
122 Id. 
123 See id. at 3 & n.5. 
124 See id. at 12. 
125 Id. at 12–13 (emphasis added). 
126 The totality of circumstances test is used by bankruptcy courts to determine if 
a debtor has engaged in substantial abuse of the bankruptcy process by filing under 
Chapter 7 when they are able to repay their debts under a Chapter 13 payment 
schedule. 
127 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2018).  
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The Fourth Circuit explained the following method for making 
this determination:  
In determining whether debt is for “personal, family, or house-
hold purposes” under [section] 101(8), courts look to the purpose 
for which the debt was incurred.  And, courts have concluded 
uniformly that debt incurred for a business venture or with a 
profit motive does not fall into the category of debt incurred for 
“personal, family, or household purposes.”  In short, debt in-
curred for a business venture is not “consumer debt” . . . .128 
A similar position has been adopted in the Eighth and Fifth 
Circuits, where courts have looked at the debtor’s purpose in 
incurring the debt to determine whether an obligation is classified 
as consumer debt.129  “If the credit transaction involves a profit 
motive, then it is not a consumer debt.  On the other hand, if a 
debt does not involve a business transaction or potential profit 
motive, then the debt is ordinarily considered a consumer debt.”130 
As shown by the examples discussed above, some debtors 
originally incur debt for a business purpose and later use the credit 
to fund personal expenses.131  Therefore, it is reasonable to inter-
pret Congress’s enactment of section 707(b) and its exceptions as 
a counter to Chapter 7 abuse by consumers who incur debt through 
“easy-credit practices,” consume the items purchased, and then 
seek discharge of their debt even if they have the ability to pay off 
their creditors.132 
Further, the Bankruptcy Code does not explain how to catego-
rize debts as “primarily” consumer debts, and courts are divided 
as to whether to only consider the overall dollar amount or include 
the relative number of claims in the consideration.133  Most courts, 
however, have held that “a debtor is considered to have primarily 
 
128 Cypher Chiropractic Ctr. v. Runski (In re Runski), 102 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 
1996) (first citing Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1988); and 
then citing In re Bell, 65 B.R. 575, 577 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986)).  
129 See Lapke v. Mut. of Omaha Bank (In re Lapke), 428 B.R. 839, 843 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2010) (citing Cox v. Fokkena (In re Cox), 315 B.R. 850, 855 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004)).  
130 In re Palmer, 117 B.R. 443, 446 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (citing In re Booth, 
858 F.2d 1051, 1054–1055 (5th Cir. 1988)).  
131 See Stewart v. U.S. Tr. (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 806–07 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that loans incurred for educational expenses were not considered “non-
consumer” debt because the debtor used the money to support his family).  
132 See id. at 812–13.  
133 In re Jones, No. 08-05676-8, 2009 WL 102442, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 
2009). 
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consumer debts when more than one half of the dollar amount of 
the debt owed is consumer in nature.”134 
In a recent 2017 case, In re Grillot, a creditor moved to dismiss 
a debtor’s Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse, arguing, among 
other things, that the debtor’s financial situation implicated the 
Means Test, that he otherwise failed it, and consequently, his case 
should be dismissed.135  The debtor, on the other hand, argued that 
section 707(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code did not apply because his 
debts were not primarily consumer debts.136  The main issue in 
Grillot was whether a guaranty of the debtor’s wife’s business debt 
was a consumer debt.137 
In Grillot, when the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he 
stated that his debts were primarily business debts and not 
primarily consumer debts.138  “He did not complete [the bankrupt-
cy form] to determine whether the [M]eans [T]est applie[d], claim-
ing to be exempt from a presumption of abuse.”139 
The debtor was a doctor, likely making a very healthy 
living.140  In fact, when he and his wife divorced, he “voluntarily 
provided support to [her] of $8,500–$10,000 per month during 
their separation.”141  As of the petition, the debtor owed almost  
$446,000 in back taxes, comprising roughly 34 percent of his $1.3 
million debt.142  The guaranty debt was approximately $642,000.143 
The guaranty of the debt arose after the debtor and his wife 
were separated.144  Without consulting with a lawyer, the debtor 
simply signed a guaranty in the amount of $613,800 to help with 
his wife’s business.145  He believed that, if he signed the guaranty, 
it would reduce spousal maintenance and would have a positive 
economic trickle-down effect with regard to another business in 
which he maintained a minority interest.146  The business failed 
and the lender sued the debtor, “obtaining a $613,000 judgment 
 
134 U.S. Tr. v. Mohr, 436 B.R. 504, 510 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (citing In re Martens, 171 
B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994)). 
135 In re Grillot, 578 B.R. 651, 656 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017). 
136 See id. at 652. 
137 See id. at 656–57. 
138 See id. at 652. 
139 Id. 
140 See id. at 652–53. 
141 Id. at 654.  
142 See id. at 653. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 654–55. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 655. 
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(plus pre-and post-judgment interest) against [the debtor]” prior 
to the bankruptcy filing.147 
Once in bankruptcy, the lender argued that the debtor “should 
be subjected to [section] 707(b)(1)’s dismissal” based on the “abuse 
provision,” claiming that debtor’s case was “either presumptively 
abusive because it fail[ed] the [M]eans [T]est or that granting 
[him] chapter 7 relief constitute[d] an abuse based upon the total-
ity of the circumstances of his financial situation.”148 
The court correctly noted that “[section] 707(b)(1) provides 
that only [C]hapter 7 cases ‘filed by an individual debtor . . . whose 
debts are primarily consumer debts’ may be subject to dismissal 
for abuse.”149  The threshold issue in Grillot, therefore, was wheth-
er the debtor’s debts were primarily consumer debts.  If they were 
not, as the court noted, section 707(b) simply would not apply, 
ending the inquiry.150  But “[i]f more than half of [the] debtor’s total 
debt [was] ‘consumer debt,’ the ‘primarily consumer debts’ 
standard in [section] 707(b)(1) [would be] met and the [M]eans 
[T]est or totality analysis [would] proceed.”151 
The entire analysis as to whether the debtor’s debts were 
“primarily consumer debts” revolved around the guaranty debt.152  
The guaranty debt was the debtor’s “largest debt, constituting 49% 
of his . . . total indebtedness.”153  If the guaranty debt and home 
mortgage debt were considered consumer debts, his consumer debt 
would “exceed 50% of the total debt.”154 
The lender in Grillot argued that the debtor and his ex-wife 
“entered into a ‘quid pro quo’ whereby [his wife] would waive any 
further support in their divorce proceeding in exchange for [the 
debtor’s] [g]uaranty.”155  The lender claimed “that trading the 
[g]uaranty for the support release ma[de] [the guaranty] a 
consumer debt as a support obligation would be.”156  The debtor 
disagreed and so did the court, despite the fact that the debtor did 
 
147 Id. at 656. 
148 Id. (footnotes omitted).  
149 Id. (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) 
(2018)). 
150 See id. at 656–67. 
151 Id. at 656. 
152 See id. at 656–57. 
153 Id. at 656. 
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 657. 
156 Id.  
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not guarantee the debt for a business he owned or controlled and 
had no financial interest in the business.157 
The court recognized that “[a]n individual’s guaranty of a 
business or commercial debt is generally a non-consumer debt,” 
while “[a] support obligation is generally a consumer debt.”158  But 
it held that the debtor had more of a “profit motive” in signing the 
guaranty agreement because he stood to possibly gain financially 
from the success of the business.159  As such, the court concluded 
that the guaranty was “predominantly a business debt that should 
not be counted as a consumer debt in the ‘primarily consumer debt’ 
calculation,” and therefore, section 707(b) was not applicable.160  
In re West provides another example.161  A debtor, Sharon West, 
signed a real estate purchase contract, making an offer to buy a 
family home on twenty-four acres in Missouri for the purchase 
price of $999,500.162  The sale was going to be a cash deal.163  The 
sale of the home did not close and the buyers sued the debtor.164  
The buyers received a judgment by default in the amount of 
approximately $1.2 million.165  Thereafter, the debtor filed for Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy.166  Believing her debts were “business debt[s],” 
she did not complete the Means Test.167  If she had, it would have 
shown that her monthly disposable income was approximately 
$2,000, which would have triggered a presumption of abuse—i.e., 
the debtor’s current monthly income would have been more than 
sufficient to fund a Chapter 13 plan over a sixty-month period.168  
The presumption, then, is that she was capable of paying creditors 
the money they were owed.169 
The sellers filed a motion to dismiss or convert the case under 
section 707(b).170  Thus, the issue before the court was whether the 
sellers’ judgment against the debtor was a “consumer debt.”171  
 
157 Id. at 658. 
158 Id. at 657 (footnotes omitted).  
159 Id. at 658.  
160 Id. at 660. 
161 James v. West (In re West), No. 16-40358, 2017 WL 746250 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
Feb. 24, 2017).  
162 Id. at *1. 
163 Id. at *2. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at *3. 
167 Id. at *5–6, *7.  
168 See id. at *6. 
169 See id. 
170 Id. at *3. 
171 Id. at *6. 
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This, the court held, turned on “whether the [d]ebtor incurred the 
debt ‘primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.’ ”172  
The court stated that “primarily” in the context of section 707(b) 
“means more than half by total dollar amount of all debt.”173  The 
“ ‘primarily’ component” was not at issue in the West case because 
“it [was] undisputed that the [sellers’] debt [was] much more than 
half of the [d]ebtor’s total debts.”174  
To determine whether the debtor’s debt was a consumer 
debt—a clear question of fact—the court looked to “the debtor’s 
purpose or intent in incurring the debt.”175  The court found that a 
debt “incurred for business ventures or other profit-seeking activ-
ities” squarely falls within the meaning of a business debt—i.e., a 
non-consumer debt.176 
The debtor, of course, had every incentive to argue that the 
debt was a business debt so that she would not be forced to use her 
$2,000 disposable income to pay creditors through a payment plan.  
She argued that she bought the home “to turn it into a bed and 
breakfast . . . , a profit motive that would render the debt a busi-
ness debt.”177  The court bought her argument and the debtor was 
able to avail herself of Chapter 7 relief.178 
In re Cherrett provides yet another example of an affluent 
debtor taking advantage of Chapter 7.179  In Cherrett, the debtor 
was offered a $300,000 salary to take a job in Aspen, Colorado, but 
he did not want to relocate his daughter to a new school.180  Thus, 
in addition to his substantial salary, his potential employer—
Aspen Skiing Company—offered him “a $500,000 housing loan,” 
which “was interest-only for the first ten years[,] . . . coupled with 
a bonus plan providing [the debtor] a guaranteed annual bonus of 
up to $33,750 to cover the interest payments on the loan.”181  
The debtor accepted the position and left his current job and 
family in Jackson Hole.182  Subsequently, the debtor purchased a 







177 Id. at *7.  
178 Id. 
179 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Cherrett (In re Cherrett), 873 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2017).  
180 Id. at 1063.  
181 Id. 
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
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the debtor and his wife filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.184  One of 
the debtor’s debts was the $550,000 he owed to Aspen under the 
housing loan.185  Aspen filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 7 
petition for abuse under section 707(b)(1), arguing “that because 
the [debtors] incurred the [h]ousing [l]oan to purchase a personal 
residence, the debt was a consumer debt, and [the debtors] were 
not entitled to Chapter 7 relief in light of their ability to pay their 
creditors [through] a . . . Chapter 13 plan.”186   
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of 
the motion.  It held that “[e]vidence that a debtor incurred a debt 
‘purely or primarily as a business investment, albeit an invest-
ment in herself or himself, much like a loan incurred for a new 
business,’ can serve as an important factor in determining the 
debtor’s purpose.”187  It also agreed with the bankruptcy court’s 
finding that the debtor incurred the debt “ ‘so he could work at a 
very prestigious, top of the line, equal to the Four Seasons, equal 
to the best hotels in the world,’ resort.”188 
There is no question that the debtor in Cherrett, like the 
debtors in the other cases mentioned, benefited from Chapter 7 
bankruptcy because he was affluent.  The debtor received a phe-
nomenal compensation package, purchased a $1 million condo—in 
addition to the home he owned in Jackson Hole, Wyoming—and 
then, when he could not service his debt load, turned to Chapter 7 
and received a discharge of his debt.  If this were the ordinary 
situation where a person takes out a small loan to purchase a 
home, even with a modest annual salary of approximately $60,000, 
that person would likely be relegated to a Chapter 13 plan and 
forced to pay creditors over a three- to-five-year period.  Cases like 
this illustrate clear loopholes favoring only the affluent bankrupt.  
Like Chapter 7, Chapter 11 also provides a mechanism where-
by those with substantial assets and income can avoid paying 
creditors over time despite their high earning potential.   
III.  THE LIQUIDATING LOOPHOLE 
Several interesting issues arise when an individual contem-
plates filing a Chapter 11 plan, but with no intention of actually 
 
184 Id. at 1063–64. 
185 Id. at 1064.  
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1067 (quoting Stewart v. U.S. Tr. (In re Stewart), 215 B.R. 456, 465 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 175 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1999)).  
188 Id. at 1068.  
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paying creditors over a period of time.  This section explores some 
of the differences between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 plans and 
whether Chapter 11 provides an avenue for the affluent to avoid 
payment plans.  Specifically, the main issue this section addresses 
is whether Chapter 11 allows a debtor to liquidate his assets to 
fund a plan, rather than contributing disposable income, and 
whether that contribution of assets results in an immediate 
discharge.  This analysis centers on section 1129(a)(15) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.   
A. Section 1129(a)(15) and Individual Plan Confirmation  
Section 1129(a)(15) of the Bankcruptcy Code, added in 2005, 
provides that—“in a case in which the debtor is an individual and 
[where] the holder of any allowed unsecured claim objects”—a plan 
may only be confirmed if:  
(A)  the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property 
to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is 
not less than the amount of such claim; or 
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is 
not less than the projected disposable income of the debtor 
(as defined in section 1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-
year period beginning on the date that the first payment is 
due under the plan, or during the period for which the plan 
provides payments, whichever is longer.189 
1. The Mandate of Section 1129(a)(15)(B) 
Under subsection (B), the confirmation requirement is that 
the debtor’s plan distribute property equal in value to the debtor’s 
projected disposable income over the five-year period commencing 
with the date that the first payment is due under the plan.  
Although based on Chapter 13 practice, the confirmation require-
ment differs. 
Generally, Chapter 13 requires that projected disposable income 
be paid to holders of allowed unsecured claims.190  “In contrast, 
[section] 1129(a)(15) provides only that the amount to be distrib-
uted under the [C]hapter 11 plan be not less than the projected 
disposable income for the required period.  Significantly, it does 
not require that the payments be made to holders of unsecured 
 
189 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15) (2018).  
190 See id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).  
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claims.”191  “There is no reason to read into [section] 1129(a)(15)(B) 
the requirement that an individual debtor must pay unsecured 
creditors his or her projected disposable income, and there is every 
reason not to do so.”192 
In fact, courts that have considered this issue have uniformly 
held that section 1129(a)(15)(B) does not require an individual 
debtor to pay an amount at least equal to her projected disposable 
income to unsecured creditors.193  All that section requires is that 
the total value of all property distributed in a plan must be equal 
to or greater than the debtor’s projected disposable income.  
2. Calculating Projected Disposable Income 
Disposable income is not defined in Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  It is, however, defined under section 1325(b)(2), 
which defines it, in pertinent part, as “current monthly income 
received by the debtor” minus various expenses and with certain 
exclusions.194  The Supreme Court held, in Hamilton v. Lanning, 
that in calculating “projected disposable income” in a Chapter 13 
case, courts should employ a “forward-looking approach,” first 
calculating disposable income, and then in unusual cases taking 
into account other known or virtually certain information about 
the debtor’s future income or expenses.195  But Chapter 11 is 
different and likely more attractive for individuals with wealth. 
Unlike Chapter 13, in Chapter 11, an individual debtor is 
allowed to have expenses that exceed those of an above-median 
income Chapter 13 debtor.  In In re Johnson, the debtor’s living 
expenses were estimated at $831,151.50, which is vastly greater 
 
191 Paul W. Bonapfel, Individual Chapter 11 Cases Under BAPCPA, 25 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 1, 57 (2006).  
192 In re Pfeifer, No. 12-13852, 2013 WL 5687512, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 
2013).  
193 See In re Gbadebo, 431 B.R. 222, 226 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The Debtor 
correctly notes that [section 1129(a)(15)(B)’s] requirement goes to the amount paid to 
all creditors under the Plan, not just to the . . . creditor who objects to the plan.”); 
Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon (In re Gordon), 465 B.R. 683, 693 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2012) (“[Section] 1129(a)(15) only requires the amount of projected disposable 
income equal the ‘value of property to be transferred under the plan’ to all creditors, 
not just unsecured creditors.”); In re Ekstrom, No. 08-07750, 2010 WL 1254893, at *7, 
*18 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2010) (holding that an individual debtor satisfied 
section 1129(a)(15) because “the value of the property to be distributed under the plan 
[was] not less than the projected disposable income of the Debtor during the period for 
which the plan provides payments,” even though most of the debtor’s plan payments 
went toward reducing his substantial tax obligations).  
194 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
195 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 509 (2010).  
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than what would be allowed in Chapter 13.196  Nonetheless, the 
plan was confirmed.197  The court’s reasoning in Johnson—which 
is correct—was that the term “projected disposable income” means 
“current monthly income received by the debtor . . . less amounts 
reasonably necessary to be expended.”198  Section 1129(a)(15)(B) 
references only section 1325(b)(2), but not section 1325(b)(3).199  
This means the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code itself would 
lead to the conclusion that section 1325(b)(3) does not apply when 
the “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” are being 
determined under section 1129(a)(15)(B).  Albeit section 1129(a)(15) 
uses the disposable income definition found in Chapter 13, the 
section is silent regarding what reasonable expenses in relation to 
the calculation of disposable income should be.200  Further, section 
1325(b)(3) can be incorporated into section 1325(b)(2) as a laundry 
list of permissible expenses.  However, this is not included in 
section 1129(a)(15).201   
The omission [in section 1129(a)(15)] appears intentional, as 
noted in a leading bankruptcy treatise:  
[T]he reference in section 1129(a)(15) is explicitly to, and only 
to, paragraph (2) of section 1325(b).  Congress had it within 
its power to draft the cross-reference more broadly, but did 
not.  It presumably took into account the business orientation 
of most [C]hapter 11s, as well as the increased levels of 
creditor involvement in a [C]hapter 11 case[ ].  These factors, 
together with the requirement that the debtor obtain the 
consent of all unsecured creditor classes under section 
1129(a)(8), would tend to indicate that individual creditor 
insistence on the artificial expenses standards found in 
[C]hapter 7 are neither necessary nor appropriate in 
[C]hapter 11 cases.202 
 
196 See In re Johnson, No. 14-57104, 2016 WL 8853601, at *16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
Nov. 10, 2016). 
197 Id.  
198 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).  
199 Id. § 1129(a)(15)(B). 
200 See id. § 1129(a)(15). 
201 In re Woodward, No. BK11-40936, 2014 WL 1682847, at *4 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
Apr. 29, 2014). 
202 Id. at *4–5 (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02[15][a] (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 16th ed. rev. 2014)).  
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3. The Temporal Component in Chapter 11 
Section 1129(a)(15) also differs from Chapter 13 in regard to 
the time component.  Under Chapter 13, a debtor’s plan must ex-
tend for three years, and in some cases five years, unless the plan 
provides for payment in full of all unsecured claims sooner.203  
Section 1129(a)(15) does not specify a minimum period.  In con-
trast, section 1129(a)(15) requires either that the debtor pay all 
unsecured claims in full or that the debtor’s plan devote an amount 
equal to five years’ worth of the debtor’s projected disposable 
income.204  Thus, if property from any other source is used to sup-
plement the payments, the plan may be shorter.  As noted in a recent 
Norton Annual Survey:  
The requirement in section 1129(a)(15) is that “the value of 
property” distributed be equal to the disposable income.  The re-
quirement is not that “the disposable income” be contributed 
directly.  Thus, in a case where a debtor has substantial assets 
that can be liquidated to fund a plan, it could be argued that if 
the value of those assets equals the projected disposable income, 
then Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(15)(B) would be satisfied 
even if no disposable income is contributed.205 
In reading section 1129(a)(15),  
Congress made clear that a Chapter 11 plan of any length may 
be confirmed as long as the value of the property to be distributed 
is not less than the projected disposable income of the debtor to 
be received over five years (or the length of the plan, whichever 
is longer).206   
Indeed, Chapter 11 
provides that if creditors are not paid in full and someone objects, 
then the plan must distribute at least the amount of the 
annualized disposable income to be received in five years or 
during the term of the plan, whichever is longer.  This process 
yields a dollar amount, and nothing else. . . .  All of [section] 
1129(a)(15) is only about the value of the property to be 
distributed under the plan, and this is entirely consistent with 
 
203 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(B). In fact, there is no minimum payment that must be 
made to unsecured creditors unless the plan is rejected by a more senior class, which 
would invoke the absolute priority rule under the Bankruptcy Code.  
204 Id. § 1129(a)(15)(B). 
205 Debra Grassgreen, Individual Chapter 11 Cases After BAPCPA: What Hap-
pened to the “Fresh Start?”, 2006 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 12.  
206 Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.3d 327, 340 (6th Cir. 2011).  
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pre-BAPCPA Chapter 11 practice, which never imposed a 
minimum plan duration.207   
This means that a Chapter 11 plan of less than one year could 
conceivably be confirmed, so long as the plan provided for 
distribution of an amount that is not less than the debtor’s 
projected disposable income over five years.   
Theoretically, a debtor wanting to take advantage of this pro-
vision would have to use something other than his disposable 
income during the five-year period.  For the affluent bankrupt, this 
would not be difficult given that most are able to tap into third-
party financial resources—for example, trust income, family wealth, 
unencumbered assets, and so forth.  This is because an individual 
Chapter 11 creditor must distribute property under the agreed 
plan that is in conformity only with the projected disposable 
income requirement calculated based on section 1129(a)(15)(B).208 
B. Completion of Payments Under the Plan; The Discharge 
Loophole; and Plan Modification  
There are two sections under Chapter 11 that discuss the 
concept of “completion of payments” under the plan, both of which 
are relevant to whether a debtor can avoid payment plans: First, 
section 1127(e), which deals with post-confirmation modification 
before the “completion of payments under the plan;”209 and second, 
section 1141(d)(5)(A), which deals with discharge following “com-
pletion of all payments under the plan.”210  If “completion of all 
payments under the plan” in a Chapter 11 case is as simple as 
liquidating a debtor’s assets and turning them over to a liquidation 
trustee for immediate or eventual distribution to creditors, a 
Chapter 11 debtor could presumably receive an immediate 
discharge; there would be no possible way to modify the debtor’s 
plan if his financial situation improves or turns out to be a mis-
representation.  Accordingly, the first issue to explore is whether 
“completion of payments” means (1) completion of payments by the 
debtor to a liquidating trustee only; or (2) completion of payments 
both by the debtor to the trustee and then by the trustee to the 
creditors.  
 
207 Randolph J. Haines, Chapter 11 May Resolve Some Chapter 13 Issues, 2007 
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Unfortunately, section 1127(e)—dealing with post-modifica-
tion—and section 1141(d)(5)(A)—dealing with debtor discharge—
provide little guidance on this issue, and no reported case 
discusses the impact of these sections on the “completion of 
payments” of an individual debtor’s Chapter 11 plan.  A leading 
treatise, however, notes that section 1127(e) is substantially 
similar to section 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code.211  And one com-
mentator opines that Chapter 13 cases dealing with post-
confirmation modification “will presumably provide guidance for 
interpretation of the identical language that BAPCPA added for 
chapter 11 cases.”212  Further, section 1141(d)(5)(A) is substantial-
ly similar to section 1328.  As such, Chapter 13 cases dealing with 
this subject will also provide interpretational guidance.   
1. Individual Discharge 
Interpretations of the language “completion of payments 
under the plan” focus on discharge under section 1141(d)(5)(A) and 
section 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Per section 1141(d)(5)(A), 
the general rule in Chapter 11 cases involving individuals is that 
the discharge will not be entered until the debtor has completed 
all payments under the plan.213  Similarly, in Chapter 13, pursuant 
to section 1328(a), an individual debtor will receive a discharge as 
soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments 
under the plan.214  But again, there is a dramatic difference when 
it comes to discharge of an individual in Chapter 13 versus an 
individual in Chapter 11.  Cases interpreting Chapter 13 discharge 
hold that prepaying a Chapter 13 plan does not constitute “com-
pletion . . . of all payments under the plan” for purposes of dis-
charge since there is an implied temporal component that would 
prevent a debtor from escaping the thirty-six-month minimum 
plan period.215 
Chapter 11 differs, as unlike section 1325(b), which requires 
a “commitment period,” section 1129(a)(15)(B) does not specify a 
minimum period and does not contain an implied temporal 
component.  Rather, the requirement in section 1129(a)(15) is that 
 
211 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 202, ¶¶1127.04, 1127.LH[2]. 
212 Bonapfel, supra note 191. 
213 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A). 
214 Id. § 1325(b). 
215 See, e.g., Fridley v. Forsythe (In re Fridley), 380 B.R. 538, 546 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2007) (holding that section 1325(b)’s “applicable commitment period” is a temporal 
requirement of thirty-six months and the debtors’ lump sum prepayment of the 
Chapter 13 plan’s proposed payment did not entitle debtors to a discharge).  
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“the value of the property” distributed be equal to the disposable 
income.216  The requirement is not that the disposable income be 
contributed directly.  Accordingly, under Chapter 11, if the debtor 
liquidates his assets to fund the plan and the value of those assets 
equals the debtor’s five-year projected disposable income, then 
section 1129(a)(15)(B) is satisfied even if no disposable income is 
contributed.  And, once the debtor gives these assets to a liqui-
dating trust, for example, “completion of payments” has occurred 
pursuant to section 1127(e) and section 1141(d)(5)(A), even if the 
trust has not completed distribution to the creditors.217  
Understanding how these provisions work makes Chapter 11 
extremely attractive to the affluent bankrupt—especially those 
who can tap into outside financial sources.  Hypothetically, the 
plan could be a straightforward liquidation plan.  On the effective 
date of the plan, the debtor could sell assets, or borrow or receive 
money from family, and simply turn over the proceeds to a liqui-
dating trustee.  Assuming that the debtor proves compliance with 
the requirements of section 1129, including that the “value of the 
property” she is distributing under the plan is greater than her 
projected disposable income for the next five years, the debtor will 
be granted a discharge on the effective date of the plan because 
she has completed her payments under the plan.   
When Congress enacted BAPCPA, it provided that until 
“completion of all payments under the plan” an individual debtor 
was ordinarily not entitled to a discharge and that before 
“completion of payments under the plan” an individual debtor’s 
plan could be modified even if substantially consummated.218  But 
as mentioned, nowhere did Congress provide that “payments 
under the plan” must be made for at least five years for individual 
Chapter 11 debtors.  It is flawed to equate the five year period in 
section 1129(a)(15)(B) used for measuring an individual debtor’s 
“projected disposable income,” and thus how many dollars a plan 
must distribute, to be a requirement that “payments under the 
plan” be at least five years in duration.  The Bankruptcy Code says 
no such thing and Congress did not manifest any intention for that 
to be the law.  
Again, this means that the first and only payment under a 
hypothetical Chapter 11 plan for an affluent bankrupt could be due 
on the effective date of the plan.  For instance, assume the debtor 
 
216 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B). 
217 Id. §§ 1127(e), 1141(d)(5)(A). 
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receives $50,000 a month in income and that his lavish expenses 
are $40,000 a month.  Based upon these amounts, the debtor’s 
projected disposable income is $600,000 (($50,000 – $40,000) x 60).  
All the debtor has to do to confirm a plan is come up with 
$600,000.01 on the effective date of the plan and distribute it to a 
liquidating trustee.  It does not matter what the debtor’s support 
expenses are determined to be.  This simply would not be a viable 
option in a Chapter 13 case, since the debtor would be required to 
devote that income for three to five years, and the monthly ex-
penses would clearly be challenged and reduced for being excessive 
and lavish.219 
In this hypothetical, the debtor would also be entitled to dis-
charge pursuant to section 1141(d)(5)(A) if the bankruptcy court 
agreed that the debtor “completed payments” under the plan.  As 
stated, section 1141(d)(5)(A) provides that debts are discharged in 
individual cases upon “completion of all payments under the 
plan.”220  A creditor challenging this maneuver would, more than 
likely, lose based on a simple reading of the Chapter 13 require-
ments that are not found in Chapter 11. 
Section 1325(b)(1)(B) permits confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan 
if, “as of the effective date of the plan,” 
the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable 
income to be received in the applicable commitment period 
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the 
plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors 
under the plan.221   
BAPCPA replaced the term “applicable commitment period” 
with the term “three-year period” to limit objections by any trustee 
or holder of an unsecured claim to those whose disposable income 
to be received will be applied to unsecured creditor payments.222  
Each of these terms—“applicable commmitment period” before 
BAPCPA and “three-year period” after it—“operated as a temporal 
requirement.”223  The “applicable commitment period” is meant to 
influence “debtors to have [C]hapter 13 plans that are longer than 
three years.”224  However, under Chapter 13 the debtors would also 
 
219 See, e.g., In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264, 273 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) (“Since the 
Debtor’s plan proposes to distribute property worth more than [his projected 
disposable income], the plan satisfies this new confirmation requirement.”).  
220 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A).  
221 Id. § 1325(b)(1).  
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be exposed to trustees or creditors requesting to increase pay-
ments for the duration of the plan.225  Thus, “[a] debtor desiring to 
prepay a [C]hapter 13 plan and obtain an early discharge without 
paying allowed unsecured claims in full must follow the [section] 
1329 modification procedure . . . .”226  
Chapter 11 does not impose this temporal requirement and 
there is no “run[ning] of the gauntlet” for modification purposes, 
as discussed below.227  Rather, section 1129(a)(15)(B) provides a 
method in which a debtor’s plan can be confirmed over the objec-
tion of an unsecured creditor if the plan does nothing more than 
distribute “property” with a “value” that is at least as much as the 
debtor’s “projected disposable income” for a five-year period.228   
Further, unlike a Chapter 13 creditor, a Chapter 11 creditor 
would be hard pressed to argue that the transfer of estate property 
to a liquidating trust is not a “completion of payments under the 
plan” for purposes of a section 1141(d)(5)(A) discharge.  Under Chap-
ter 13, creditors can successfully argue that the phrase “com-
pletion of payments under the plan” requires evidence that claims 
are paid as proposed by the plan, including all payments being 
actually distributed to creditors and not just conveyed to a 
liquidating trust of some sort.  Simply put, that is not what the 
Bankruptcy Code says.  Section 1141(d)(5)(A) provides that ordi-
narily, a discharge cannot be granted to an individual debtor until 
“completion of all payments under the plan.”229  But section 1141 
does not say a discharge cannot be granted until all claims are 
paid.  Using Chapter 13 cases, in contrast, would not be to the 
benefit of the creditor because it has generally been held that a 
Chapter 13 plan is “complete” when the debtor makes all pay-
ments to the trustee, not when the trustee distributes the 
payments to the creditors.230  Thus, under a literal reading of the 
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Bankruptcy Code, when a debtor completes her obligations as 
provided for in the plan, that debtor has effected a completion of 
payments under such plan.  
In the hypothetical discussed above, the debtor would likely 
be entitled to a discharge on the effective date of the plan because, 
at that point, she will have distributed property ($600,000.01) to 
the liquidating trustee, the value of which is greater than her 
projected disposable income for the five-year period.  This satisfies 
the only confirmation requirement set forth in section 1129(a)(15) 
and constitutes a completion of all payments under the plan for 
purposes of section 1141(d)(5)(A).  
2. Post-Confirmation Modification 
What if, in the above-discussed hypothetical, the debtor, just 
one year later, begins amassing great wealth?  Or, what if prior to 
bankruptcy, the debtor intentionally stopped receiving income to 
reduce her projected disposable income, and then shortly after the 
plan is confirmed and the debtor has turned over the property to 
the liquidating trustee, she begins making a substantial amount 
of money?  Could the plan be modified?  Could distributions to 
creditors become greater?  The answer—if a “completion of pay-
ments under the [Chapter 11] plan” has occurred—is no.  Under 
Chapter 13, the answer would be yes.  
In a Chapter 11 case in which the debtor is an individual, the 
2005 Amendments have altered the rules regarding post-confir-
mation modification.  Section 1127(e) provides: 
If the debtor is an individual, the plan may be modified at any 
time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of 
payments under the plan, whether or not the plan has been sub-
stantially consummated, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, 
the United States trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured 
claim, to— 
(1)  increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a 
particular class provided for by the plan;  
(2) extend or reduce the time period of such payments; or 
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose 
claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to 
take account of any payment of such claim made other than 
under the plan.231 
 
required payments as promptly as possible because the debtor will be assured of 
receiving a discharge when the debtor’s payments are completed.”).  
231 11 U.S.C. § 1127(e). 
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There is no doubt that section 1127(e) was created to give 
unsecured creditors the ability to propose post-confirmation 
amendments to an individual debtor’s plan in situations in which 
there has been a substantial change in the debtor’s income or 
expenses that was not anticipated at the time of the confirmation 
hearing.  A similar provision exists in Chapter 13.  The problem, 
however, is that this provision dissolves the second the debtor 
completes payments under the plan, which, as discussed above, 
can happen on the effective date by turning over the assets to a 
liquidating trustee.  In other words, section 1127(e) is truly mean-
ingless in Chapter 11 liquidating plans.  
IV.  CREATING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
There are a few ways to approach the affluent debtor issue.  
First, one can take the “leave-it-alone” approach.  Under this ap-
proach, one would argue that the Bankruptcy Code says what it 
says and that there are no “loopholes” for the affluent.  One would 
point out that the Bankruptcy Code is clear on its face and 
Congress meant what it said.  If this thought process is followed, 
nothing will change.  Those individuals who want to take advan-
tage of Chapter 7 liquidation without dealing with the Means Test 
can simply accumulate more business debt than personal debt by 
signing guaranty agreements, purchasing investment properties, 
buying expensive homes in order to take a new job, and so on.  
Those who want to avoid Chapter 7 and 13, but do not want to be 
relegated to a five-year payment plan and potential post-modifi-
cation motions when their lifestyles improve, can reduce their 
monthly income prior to filing, incur a substantial amount of 
lavish expenses, and then find assets that are greater than five 
years’ worth of disposable income.   
A second approach would be to modify or amend the 
Bankruptcy Code, which is highly difficult and unlikely.  To be 
effective, this would entail abolishing the “primarily consumer 
debt” language under Chapter 7 and forcing all individuals with 
higher incomes into Chapter 13 or 11.  In addition, Congress would 
have to modify Chapter 11 to add a temporal component to 
individual Chapter 11 plans—for example, debtors would not be 
able to complete payments on the effective date of the plan.  
Instead, similar to a Chapter 13 case, debtors would be relegated 
to a longer period in which to pay creditors.  This would give cred-
itors the opportunity to move for modifications to the plan when, 
and if, the debtor’s financial situation dramatically improves. 
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The third approach—and what this Article suggests—is that 
when these concerns arise, the issue of bad faith should be heavily 
addressed.  In non-consumer Chapter 7 cases, this Article argues 
that bad faith can constitute a cause for dismissal under section 
707(a).  Specifically, when evidence suggests that debtors have 
manipulated their income to avoid the Means Test, dismissal may 
be appropriate.  Similarly, in individual Chapter 11 cases, this 
Article argues that section 1129(a)(3) places a burden upon the 
debtor to prove that her plan is being executed in good faith.  When 
evidence suggests that the debtor has manipulated her income 
prior to filing to reduce income and increase expenses, and when 
the debtor is proposing to complete all payments under the plan 
on the effective date, a presumption of bad faith should arise.   
A. Bad Faith Under Chapter 7  
Congress, yet again, is looking after the best interests of the 
well-to-do by making their cases in Chapter 7 more difficult to 
dismiss than those cases with primarily consumer debts.  Dismiss-
ing cases pursuant to sections 707(b)(1) to (3) is permissible if: 
(1) there is a presumption of abuse based on the debtor’s monthly 
net income being higher than the Means Test standard; or (2) if 
the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s financial situation 
show abuse or that the filing was done in bad faith.232  Section 
707(b)(1) states, in pertinent part that a court may sua sponte or 
after a motion by any party in interest, “[a]fter notice and a 
hearing,” dismiss a filed case if the individual debtor’s “debts are 
primarily consumer debts” and the court finds “the granting of 
relief would be an abuse” of Chapter 7 provisions.233 
Of course, before even dismissing a case under section 707(b), 
a court would be required to determine that the debtor has 
“primarily consumer debts,” and this determination, as discussed 
in this Article, hinges upon the reasons why the debts were 
incurred.  If the debts were incurred primarily for personal, family, 
or household purposes, this section would apply.  But if they are 
incurred for a profit motive, the entirety of section 707(b) would be 
inapplicable because a section 707(b) dismissal is only available 
when a Chapter 7 debtor has primarily consumer debts.   
 
232 In re Piazza, 451 B.R. 608, 611–12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. 
Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253 
(11th Cir. 2013).  
233 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).  
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Notwithstanding, this Article contends that section 707(a) 
warrants dismissal for the affluent debtor attempting to avoid 
Chapters 13 and 11 by living a lavish lifestyle and incurring a 
substantial amount of business debt.  In other words, this Article 
asserts that bad faith constitutes a case for dismissal of a Chapter 
7 case under section 707(a), despite several cases holding that 
there is no “good faith” filing requirement in Chapter 7 cases.   
Section 707(a) states:  
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice 
and a hearing and only for cause, including— 
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors;  
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under [C]hapter 
123 of title 28; and 
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen 
days or such additional time as the court may allow after the 
filing of the petition commencing such case, the information 
required by paragraph (1) of section 521(a), but only on a 
motion by the United States trustee.234 
Courts seem to agree that the three examples of “cause” found 
in section 707(a) “are illustrative, not exhaustive.”235  Thus, no 
court should be limited to the three examples found in section 
707(a) in determining whether there is cause to dismiss a Chapter 
7 case.  
But the unanimity of opinions on the application of section 
707(a) stops there.  Courts have wrestled with the question of what 
constitutes “for cause,” whether the “good faith” or “bad faith” of 
the debtor matters and, if it does matter, what conduct encom-
passes “bad faith.”236   
A few questions, therefore, arise that appear to be troubling 
bankruptcy courts.  First, whether section 707(a) imposes a duty 
of “good faith” on debtor, and second, what exactly constitutes bad 




234 Id. § 707(a) (emphasis added).  
235 See In re Piazza, 719 F.3d at 1261; Smith v. Geltzer (In re Smith), 507 F.3d 64, 
72 (2d Cir. 2007); Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1994); Indus. Ins. 
Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126 (6th Cir. 1991). 
236 11 U.S.C. § 707(a); Shangraw v. Etcheverry (In re Etcheverry), 242 B.R. 503, 
505 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). 
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1. Does Section 707(a) Impose a Duty of “Good Faith” on 
Debtors? 
At one end of the spectrum, courts have answered this 
question with a flat “no,” stating that section 707(a) “does not 
include an implicit good faith requirement in the context of the 
dismissal of Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation proceedings.”237  On 
the other end of the spectrum, courts have held that a debtor’s 
prepetition bad faith in the bankruptcy process may serve as the 
basis for dismissal under section 707(a).  The Fifth Circuit, for 
example, in holding so, reasoned: “This is no more than acknowl-
edgment in the [C]hapter 7 context of what has long been 
recognized: ‘Every bankruptcy statute since 1898 has incorporated 
literally, or by judicial interpretation, a standard of good faith for 
the commencement, prosecution, and confirmation of bankruptcy 
proceedings.’ ”238 
Other decisions seem to fall somewhere in between.  On the 
restrictive and more limited end, the Ninth Circuit, for example, 
has concluded that “bad faith per se can properly constitute ‘cause’ 
for dismissal of a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 petition” but cannot be 
cause for dismissal under section 707(a).239  Consequently, the 
court “discarded the ‘bad faith’ label in favor of simply examining 
the actions of the debtor” to assess whether his prepetition con-
duct—which included, among other things, running up credit card 
debt in advance of filing his bankruptcy petition—“provide[d] 
‘cause’ for dismissal under [section] 707(a).”240  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded it did not.241 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that while “some 
conduct constituting cause to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition may 
readily be characterized as bad faith[,] . . . framing the issue in 
terms of bad faith may tend to misdirect the inquiry away from 
the fundamental principles and purposes of Chapter 7.”242  In 
citing a case out of the district of Minnesota, the Eighth Circuit 
adopted a “narrow, cautious approach to bad faith,” concluding 
 
237 In re Etcheverry, 242 B.R. at 504; see also In re Landes, 195 B.R. 855, 862 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding there is no good faith filing requirement in Chapter 7 
cases).  
238 Krueger v. Torres (In re Krueger), 812 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 
F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986)).  
239 In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1193. 
240 Id.  
241 Id. at 1194. 
242 Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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that bad faith under section 707(a) should “be limited to extreme 
misconduct falling outside the purview of more specific Code pro-
visions, such as using bankruptcy as a ‘scorched earth’ tactic 
against a diligent creditor, or using bankruptcy as a refuge from 
another court’s jurisdiction.”243 
Other circuits, including the Eleventh Circuit, have taken a less 
restrictive approach to a section 707(a) dismissal.  In a 2013 case, 
the Eleventh Circuit examined both legal and non-legal definitions 
of the word “cause” and held that “the ordinary meaning of ‘cause’ 
is adequate or sufficient reason.”244  Applying this definition, the 
court held that “prepetition bad faith” is a “sufficient reason” for 
dismissal under section 707(a).245  It reasoned that “[b]ad-faith 
bankruptcy filings significantly burden the legal system in general 
and bankruptcy courts in particular.”246  The court further held 
that bankruptcy courts can, and should, sanction litigants for “any 
improper purpose” under Rule 9011(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure and can also “tak[e] any action . . . neces-
sary or appropriate . . . to prevent an abuse of process” under 
section 105(a).247  It stated: “[W]e see no reason why prepetition 
bad faith should not constitute an adequate or sufficient reason for 
dismissal.  To hold otherwise would ‘create[ ] the appearance that 
such an abusive practice is implicitly condoned by the [Bankruptcy] 
Code.’ ”248  
The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[a] lack of good faith . . . has 
been recognized in a number of bankruptcy cases as a valid cause 
of dismissal under [section] 707(a).”249 
The Fifth Circuit has held that “[c]ourts have broad authority 
to determine what [constitutes] cause for dismissal under [section] 
707(a).”250  It stated: “[C]ause is any reason cognizable to the equity 
power and conscience of the court as constituting an abuse of the 
bankruptcy process,” including “prepetition bad-faith conduct, 
 
243 Id. (citing In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 624-26 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994)).  
244 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 
1253, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2013).  
245 Id. at 1262. 
246 Id.  
247 Id. (alterations in original). 
248 Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Dinova v. Harris (In re 
Dinova), 212 B.R. 437, 441 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997)). 
249 Indus. Ins. Servs. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1991). 
250 Krueger v. Torres (In re Krueger), 812 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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postpetition bad faith conduct, or petitions that simply serve no 
legitimate bankruptcy purpose.”251 
In short, recent case law confirms that “most courts accept the 
proposition that a debtor’s bad faith can constitute ‘cause’ for the 
dismissal of a case under [section] 707(a).”252 
2. What Constitutes Bad Faith or Cause Under Section 707(a)? 
“Recognizing that bad faith may justify the dismissal of a 
Chapter 7 case is one thing, trying to identify or articulate what 
bad faith actually is in the context of a Chapter 7 filing is a much 
more problematic endeavor.”253  “Not surprisingly, courts disagree 
sharply about the proper standard.”254 
On one end of the spectrum, there are cases in which courts 
have concluded that the debtor’s ability to pay should not be 
considered in the good faith analysis.  These cases focus on the 
history of section 707 and conclude that “noneconomic factors” are 
not appropriate for consideration in the good faith analysis.  As 
one court noted:  
In a Chapter 7 case . . . the potential bases for dismissal on 
grounds of bad faith are narrow. “The ultimate question [is] 
whether the petition was filed with the intent and desire to 
obtain the relief that is available under a particular chapter of 
the Bankruptcy Code, through the means that Congress has 
specified, or whether the debtor is pursuing some other goal.” In 
Chapter 7, a case should be dismissed on account of bad faith only 
where the debtor has taken advantage of the court’s jurisdiction 
in a manner abhorrent to the purposes of Chapter 7.255 
Another court traced the legislative history of section 707 and 
found that “[i]n passing on a motion for dismissal under [section] 
707(a) . . . the Bankruptcy Court should exclude any consideration 
that goes to the debtor’s financial means.”256  It also criticized de-
cisions basing dismissal on the debtor’s ability to pay, concluding, 
“[t]hese decisions are fundamentally flawed in their analy-
sis . . . because the question of whether a Chapter 7 debtor could 
 
251 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
252 In re Tallman, 397 B.R. 451, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008) (cataloging cases).  
253 Id. 
254 In re Bushyhead, No. 15-CV-89, 2016 WL 11263627, at *5 (N.D. Okla. May 25, 
2016).  
255 In re Kane & Kane, 406 B.R. 163, 168 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (second altera-
tion in original) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Tallman, 397 B.R. at 456).  
256 In re Khan, 172 B.R 613, 624 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).  
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meet dischargeable debt obligations in whole or [in] part from 
future resources is irrelevant to a motion under [section] 707(a).”257   
The court pronounced what it believed to be the correct “good 
faith” inquiry as one that primarily focuses on the debtor’s 
“manifested attitude” in relation to the bankruptcy process.258  The 
court emphasized that the proper question to ask is whether the 
debtor is filing for bankruptcy for the relief that Congress intended 
to make available and whether the debtor is willing to comply, 
“responsibly,” with the imposed duties and costs for receiving the 
intended relief.259  
Thus, a presumption of “bad faith” would arise if a debtor is 
filing to receive the benefits of a bankruptcy filing and simulta-
neously evade, either “intentionally or fraudulently,” all of the 
duties or detriments that accompany the relief sought.260 A filing 
with the intention to intervene with an automatic stay of section 
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code or a motivation to use bankruptcy 
as a “tactic against a pressing creditor or opponent in litigation” 
without any adherence to the duties will also rise to the 
determination of a bad faith filing.261 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the narrow approach to bad 
faith adopted in Khan.  It stated that a finding of bad faith may be 
supported when the debtor has a “frivolous, non[-]economic motive 
for filing a bankruptcy petition, when there is a sinister or 
unworthy purpose, or when there is an abuse of the judicial 
process.”262  However, the court specified that taking advantage of 
legal rights, on its own, will not suffice to find for a bad faith filing 
on behalf of the debtor.263 
In Huckfeldt, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 7 filing, concluding that: (1) the 
debtor filed the petition for the purposes of frustrating a divorce 
order and forcing his ex-wife into bankruptcy; and (2) the debtor 
had manipulated his earnings “to ensure that the Chapter 7 
proceeding would achieve these non-economic motives.”264  
Some courts, on the other hand—and this Article supports 
this conclusion—have expressly held that the debtor’s income 
 
257 Id. at 622. 




262 Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994).  
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 832. 
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may, and should, be considered as a factor in the “for cause” 
analysis.  For example, the Third Circuit in Perlin stated:  
While the legislative history makes clear that a debtor’s ability 
to repay his debts is inadequate cause for dismissal, we do not 
read the history as prohibiting a bankruptcy court from consider-
ing a debtor’s substantial income and expenses in determining 
whether the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition in good faith.  
The legislative history establishes only that a debtor’s ability to 
repay is an invalid cause for dismissal.  It does not indicate that 
a bankruptcy court must ignore the economic reality of a debtor’s 
financial situation in determining whether a valid cause for 
dismissal exists.265 
The Fifth Circuit has adopted an even broader view, stating 
that “[c]ourts have broad authority to determine what is cause for 
dismissal under [section] 707(a): ‘[C]ause is any reason cognizable 
to the equity power and conscience of the court as constituting an 
abuse of the bankruptcy process.’ ”266  
The most expansive view—for which this Article advocates—
is set forth in In re Piazza, where the Eleventh Circuit adopted 
“the ordinary meaning of ‘cause,’ as authorizing dismissal when 
adequate or sufficient reason exists for such an action.”267  Stating 
that “[b]ad faith does not lend itself to a strict formula,” the court 
accepted a “totality of the circumstances” approach that included 
inquiry into whether the debtor “failed to repay his creditors or 
‘make life-style adjustments’ despite his debts.”268  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that:  
The totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry looks for “atypical” 
conduct that falls short of the “honest and forthright invocation 
of the [Bankruptcy] Code’s protections.”  In making that determi-
nation, bankruptcy courts must, as they so often do, “sift the 
circumstances surrounding [a] claim to see that injustice or 
unfairness is not done.”  Under this inquiry, bad faith is ultimate-
ly “evidenced by the debtor’s deliberate acts or omissions that 
 
265 Perlin v. Hitachi Cap. Am. Corp. (In re Perlin), 497 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2007); 
see also In re Woodburn, No. 07-00927-5, 2008 WL 2777352, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
July 17, 2008) (“The court may consider the debtor’s ability to repay debts, but ability 
to repay debts alone is not sufficient grounds to dismiss a case under [section] 
707(a).”). 
266 Krueger v. Torres (In re Krueger), 812 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2016) (third 
alteration in original) (quoting Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. 
(In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
267 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 
1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013). 
268 Id. at 1271, 1273–74.  
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constitute a misuse or abuse of provisions, purpose, or spirit of 
the Bankruptcy Code.”269 
Piazza directly addresses the affluent-debtor problem and 
provides a potential solution to handling these issues.  The debtor, 
Piazza, filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on October 8, 2010, 
“a day before [the] deadline to produce documents relevant to a 
state court final judgment.”270  The judgment was the result of the 
debtor’s failure to pay a business guarantee to Nueterra Health-
care Physical Therapy, which became a creditor in the bankruptcy 
case.271  At the time he filed for bankruptcy, the debtor made about 
$8,000 a month and so did his wife.272  As such, at the time the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy, he and his wife, together, earned 
almost $200,000 a year. 
When the debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the 
creditor filed a motion explicitly asking the court to dismiss the 
case pursuant to sections 707(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).273  But all of 
the creditor’s section 707(b) arguments “hinge[d] on the assump-
tion that the [d]ebtor improperly declared . . . the majority of his 
debt [as] non-consumer (business) debt.”274  This was an important 
point in the creditor’s motion because if the debtor was, instead, 
primarily a consumer debtor, the case would be dismissed for 
failure to satisfy the Means Test—i.e., the debtor would have 
sufficient money to fund a Chapter 13 plan or not need bankruptcy 
to deal with his debt obligations.275  Unfortunately for the creditor, 
the court concluded that the debtor’s non-consumer business debt 
was at least 55 percent of the total debt.276  This meant that the 
creditor could not pursue a section 707(b) motion for dismissal as 
it is only available when a Chapter 7 debtor has primarily 
consumer debts.  Nonetheless, at the hearing on the motion, the 
creditor moved to dismiss the case under section 707(a), alleging 
that it was a bad-faith bankruptcy filing.277  
 
269 Id. at 1271–72 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  
270 In re Piazza, 451 B.R. 608, 610 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Piazza 
v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253 (11th 
Cir. 2013).  
271 Id.  
272 See id.  
273 See id. at 611. 
274 Id. 
275 See id.  
276 See id. at 613.  
277 See id.  
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At the time the bankruptcy court in Piazza was deciding the 
section 707(a) issue, the Eleventh Circuit had not addressed 
whether bad faith constituted cause for dismissal of a Chapter 7 
case.  The court in Piazza observed that several districts had reached 
conflicting decisions, acknowledging some found there was no good 
faith filing requirement in a Chapter 7 case.278   
The Piazza court rejected this approach and, in doing so, 
stated that “one of the primary policy aims of bankruptcy[ is] to 
give the honest yet unfortunate debtor a fresh start—not the 
dishonest business person a head start.”279  It further concluded 
that “[w]hether a debtor is a consumer or non-consumer debtor 
is . . . irrelevant to whether a Chapter 7 case may be dismissed for 
bad faith.”280  And “[b]ecause there is no reason to exempt business 
debtors from the good faith requirement imposed by BAPCPA 
upon consumer debtors, . . . that bad faith can constitute cause for 
dismissal of a Chapter 7 case under [section] 707(a).”281 
What makes Piazza useful for judges and attorneys repre-
senting creditors who believe affluent debtors are taking ad-
vantage of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is that it sets forth various 
factors that help shed light on a debtor’s intentions and assists in 
determining whether the debtor is truly an honest, but unfortu-
nate, debtor entitled to a fresh start.  This Article contends that 
the factors identified by the court in Piazza should be heavily 
employed and analyzed in cases where individual debtors are 
avoiding the Means Test by asserting non-consumer debt as their 
primary source of debt.  The factors that this Article would like to 
see courts adopt are as follows:  
(i)  the debtor reduced his creditors to a single creditor shortly 
before the petition date; 
(ii) the debtor made no life-style adjustments or continued 
living a lavish life-style; 
(iii)  the debtor filed the case in response to a judgment, pending 
litigation, or collection action; 
(iv)  there is an intent to avoid a large, single debt; 
(v)  the debtor made no effort to repay his debts; 
(vi)  the unfairness of the use of Chapter 7; 
(vii)  the debtor has sufficient resources to pay his debts; 
(viii)  the debtor is paying debts of insiders; 
 
278 Id.  
279 Id.  
280 Id.  
281 Id. at 614.  
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(ix)  the schedules inflate expenses to disguise financial well-
being; 
(x)  the debtor transferred assets; 
(xi) the debtor is over-utilizing the protections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to the unconscionable detriment of creditors; 
(xii) the debtor employed a deliberate and persistent pattern of 
evading a single major creditor; 
(xiii) the debtor failed to make candid and full disclosure; 
(xiv) the debtor’s debts are modest in relation to his assets and 
income; and 
(xv) there are multiple bankruptcy filings or other procedural 
“gymnastics.”282 
Most of the time, the three statutorily listed grounds for dis-
missal in section 707(a)’s non-exclusive list will not be present.  As 
such, the foregoing factors become extremely useful to bankruptcy 
courts and practitioners when combating affluent-debtor abuse.  
In the Piazza case, for example, the evidence suggested that:  
(1) the Debtor filed his petition to avoid a final judgment; (2) the 
Debtor failed to disclose the amount of debt owed to [another 
creditor]; (3) the Debtor had the ability to repay his debts or a 
portion of his debts; and (4) the Debtor continue[d] to maintain 
high expenditures . . . and a lavish lifestyle . . . .283 
As part of his “lavish lifestyle,” the debtor continued making 
payments in the amount of $2,000 a month to his wife’s 401k 
account, “continued to pay high credit card expenses, and 
continued to lease a luxury vehicle.”284 
Without adopting these factors, the court would have likely 
lost its avenue to dismiss the debtor’s case because of his “non-
consumer” status.  Further, the court noted, “[t]here was no sud-
den financial disaster, the Debtor and his spouse still maintained 
their jobs, no medical crisis occurred, [and] the petition was timed 
perfectly to stay the Creditor’s collection efforts . . . .”285  The court 
also found that it was uncontroverted that the debtor had “not 
made any material lifestyle adjustments, and continue[d] to 
contribute significant amounts to his wife’s retirement fund at the 
expense of his creditors.”286  
 When it came to analyzing whether the debtor had sufficient 
resources to pay his debts, the court considered: (1) the $2,000 
 
282 Id. at 614–15. 
283 Id. at 616. 
284 Id. 
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monthly contribution by the debtor to his wife’s 401(k); (2) a 
luxury vehicle leased by the debtor; (3) the transfer of “thousands 
of dollars to his wife” only one month prior to the petition; (4) the 
wife’s “successful career”; and (5) the ability of the debtor to repay 
“a portion of his debts to creditors.”287 
Based upon the foregoing, the court properly concluded that, 
based on the articulated factors, the debtor had acted in bad faith 
and therefore granted the creditor’s motion to dismiss.288 
Because amendments to the Bankruptcy Code do not appear 
to be forthcoming—especially with respect to the issues identified 
herein—it seems that a reasonable means to combat the abuse is 
to take the approach identified in this Article.  Individual debtors 
who avoid the Means Test by claiming they have more business 
debt than consumer debt should be forced to go through the “good 
faith gauntlet.”  What most of these debtors have in common is the 
failure to make lifestyle adjustments prior to a bankruptcy filing, 
the desire to continue a lavish lifestyle, the idea that they do not 
have to make an effort to repay their debts, the means and re-
sources to pay debts, and the avoidance of candid and full 
disclosures in their filings.  The factors identified above will surely 
disqualify the affluent bankrupt from filing under Chapter 7. 
Another issue, however, is how the courts and practitioners 
should handle an affluent debtor in Chapter 11 seeking to receive 
an immediate discharge on the effective date of her plan by 
contributing assets to a liquidating trust and paying creditors a 
fraction of their claims.  The answer is parallel to the solution for 
Chapter 7: bad faith must be scrutinized heavily in Chapter 11 
cases. 
B. Bad Faith Under Chapter 11 
Pursuant to section 1129(a)(3), the party seeking confirmation 
must show that “[t]he plan has been proposed in good faith and 
not by any means forbidden by law.”289  However, as explained by 
the Seventh Circuit, good faith can be seen as a “reasonable likeli-
hood that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”290  Thus, despite 
 
287 Id. 
288 See id.  
289 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2018). 
290 In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 424–25 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting In 
re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)); see also Kane v. Johns-
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the lack of a definition under section 1129(a)(3), the focus should 
be on whether the plan will yield results that are in accord with 
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The good faith standard found in section 1129(a)(3) “speaks 
more to the process of plan development than to the content of the 
plan.”291  And it must be viewed in light of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the establishment of a Chapter 11 plan, 
including the debtor’s pre-filing conduct.292  In assessing the total-
ity of circumstances, a court has “ ‘considerable judicial discretion’ 
in finding good faith.”293  Moreover, the bankruptcy courts are “in 
the best position to assess the good faith of the parties’ propos-
als.”294  Notwithstanding, “the fact that a debtor proposes a plan 
in which it avails itself of an applicable Code provision does not 
constitute evidence of bad faith.”295 
In short, the “touchstone” of the good faith inquiry is “the plan 
itself and whether it will achieve a result consistent with the 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”296  Factors that 
courts have considered in determining a debtor’s good faith include 
if the plan: “(1) fosters a result consistent with the [Bankruptcy] 
Code’s objectives, (2) the plan has been proposed with honesty and 
good intentions and with a basis for expecting that reorganization 
can be effected, and (3) [the plan exhibited a] fundamental fairness 
in dealing with the creditors.”297 
Regarding the first factor, the United States Supreme Court 
has specifically identified two purposes of Chapter 11: “preserving 
 
‘the plan was proposed with “honesty and good intentions” and with “a basis for 
expecting that a reorganization can be effected.” ’ ”) (quoting Koelbl v. Glessing (In re 
Koelbl), 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)).  
291 In re Bush Indus., Inc., 315 B.R. 292, 304 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004).  
292 See In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d at 425; see also Jasik v. Conrad (In 
re Jasik), 727 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1984); In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 
2003 WL 23861928, at *51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 207 
B.R. 764, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 469 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1990); In re Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc., 37 B.R. 141, 149 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
293 In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 271 B.R. 228, 234 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (quoting 
In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 401 (D.N.J. 2000)).  
294 In re Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 853 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988), aff’d in part, 
remanded in part, 103 B.R. 521 (D.N.J. 1989). 
295 In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 228 B.R. 339, 347 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998), aff’d, 
324 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2003).  
296 In re Frascella Enters., Inc., 360 B.R. 435, 446 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting 
In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 242 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
297 In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 609 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) 
(citations omitted).  
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going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy 
creditors.”298 
The second factor requires that the plan has been proposed 
with honesty and good intentions, and that it “has a reasonable 
hope of success.”299  The Third Circuit has provided guidance on 
this point, stating that, “[a]t its most fundamental level, the good 
faith requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy Code’s careful 
balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose aims 
are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.”300  In ana-
lyzing whether a debtor’s plan has been proposed for honest and 
good faith reasons, courts regularly consider “whether the debtor 
intended to abuse the judicial process,” whether the plan was 
proposed for ulterior motives, or if “no realistic probability of an 
effective reorganization exists.”301 
The third and final factor courts consider in determining good 
faith is whether the debtor exhibited a fundamental unfairness 
when dealing with its creditors.  To comply with this requirement, 
the plan must treat all parties fairly and ensure its confirmation 
comports with due process.302 
Like section 707(a)’s dismissal authority for the Chapter 7 
cases, this Article contends that section 1129(a)(3) provides the 
best approach for challenging affluent debtors who are using 
Chapter 11 as an abusive tactic.  However, the factors discussed 
above for Chapter 7 cases should also be employed in this analysis.  
To understand how simple it is for an individual to abuse Chapter 
11, consider the following hypothetical: 
For the last ten years, Daryl has received $10 million a year 
from a trust fund.  He has no job and has over-expended in every 
way possible.  He now has approximately $50 million of debt.  He 
cannot qualify for Chapter 7 because his debts—for example, a 
Lamborghini, a penthouse, gambling debt, and more—are consid-
ered consumer goods and his “income” of $10 million a year would 
disqualify him under the Means Test.  But Daryl does not want to 
be under the control of a trustee, so he must figure out a way to 
 
298 Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 
453 (1999). 
299 Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc. (In re Sun Country Dev., Inc.), 764 F.2d 406, 
408 (5th Cir. 1985). 
300 NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. v. Integrated Telecom Express, Inc. (In re Integrated 
Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004). 
301 In re Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 853 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988), aff’d in part, 
remanded in part, 103 B.R. 521 (D.N.J. 1989). 
302 In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 39, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). 
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avoid Chapter 13.  Also, Daryl does not want the $10 million figure 
to be used in his disposable income calculation, so a year before 
bankruptcy, the trustee of his trust, at Daryl’s request, reduces his 
income to $200,000 a year—that is, $16,666 a month.  Assume Daryl 
has reduced his expenses to $15,000 a month.  Based on these 
amounts, Daryl’s projected disposable income is $99,960 ((16,666 
– $15,000) x 60).  All that Daryl has to do to confirm a plan is come 
up with $99,961 on the effective date of the plan and transfer it to 
a liquidating trustee.  The $99,961 could likely be gifted to him via 
the trust or his wealthy father.303  Daryl would then be entitled to 
a discharge pursuant to section 1141(d)(5)(A) because he would 
have “completed payments” under the plan.  Further, creditors 
could not seek to modify the plan because payments were already 
“completed” under the plan.  A few months after the effective date 
of the plan, Daryl could enhance his trust payments to $10 million 
a year again, acquire more assets, and move on as if nothing 
happened, all while receiving a substantial discharge of unsecured 
debt.  Further, depending on the state, Daryl could have accom-
plished all of this while living in a $20 million home with a 
substantial amount of equity. 
Should Daryl’s plan be confirmed?  Technically, it has satis-
fied section 1129(a)(15).  Thus, the only chance a creditor would 
have to dismantle the plan would be to challenge his case as a 
violation of section 1129(a)(3)’s good faith requirement.  In turning 
to the good faith analyses adopted by the courts in Chapter 11 
cases, Daryl’s plan might survive, although there is a question as 
to whether it was proposed with honesty and good intentions and 
whether he exhibited a fundamental fairness in dealing with his 
creditors.  If courts, however, were to also adopt the factors articu-
lated above from the Piazza court, creditors would be more 
effective in combating the affluent Chapter 11 debtor.  In analyz-
ing those factors, the following would likely be present in a case 
where the debtor transfers assets to the liquidating trustee in 
return for an immediate discharge.  In Daryl’s case: (1) Daryl 
made no lifestyle adjustments or continued living a lavish lifestyle; 
(2) Daryl made no real effort to repay his debts; (3) Daryl has 
sufficient resources to pay his debts; (4) Daryl’s schedules likely 
 
303 Clearly, the “best interest of creditors test” would come up with respect to the 
debtor’s assets and whether creditors would receive more under a hypothetical 
liquidation, but this Article assumes that the majority of a debtor’s assets are 
encumbered by perfected security interests, leaving unsecured creditors with nothing 
in a Chapter 7 case. 
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inflate expenses to disguise financial well-being; (5) Daryl is over-
utilizing the protections of the Bankruptcy Code to the 
unconscionable detriment of creditors; and (6) Daryl likely failed 
to make candid and full disclosures. 
CONCLUSION 
The affluent debtor problem is significant.  There is no doubt 
that those with money and assets are treated more favorably 
under the Bankruptcy Code than the honest, yet unfortunate, 
debtor.  Whether Congress intended this result is a mystery.  The 
provisions that benefit the affluent will likely stand for years to 
come.  Amending the Bankruptcy Code or repealing these provisions 
seem unlikely.  Instead, the simplest way to combat this abuse is 
by making sure that no debtor is exempt from the good faith 
requirement found in Chapters 7 and 11 and that bad faith can, 
and should, constitute cause for dismissal.  When the Chapter 7 
debtor is avoiding the Means Test by making a “non-consumer” 
debt claim, or when the Chapter 11 debtor is proposing a plan that 
avoids repayment over a period of time, but instead an immediate 
discharge upon the transferring of assets to a liquidating trustee, 
the good faith analysis should be highly prevalent and scrutinized 
in every case. 
 
